

# ISAS Working Paper

No. 235 – 26 July 2016

469A Bukit Timah Road  
#07-01, Tower Block, Singapore 259770  
Tel: 6516 6179 / 6516 4239  
Fax: 6776 7505 / 6314 5447  
Email: [isassecc@nus.edu.sg](mailto:isassecc@nus.edu.sg)  
Website: [www.isas.nus.edu.sg](http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg)



## **Attempted Military Coup in Turkey: Some Lessons for South Asia and the Muslim World**

Shahid Javed Burki<sup>1</sup>

*This paper examines the failed coup d'état in Turkey in the context of political developments in the western part of the Muslim world – the stretch of land from Morocco to Bangladesh. Of the 33 countries in this area, only three could be said to have moved towards developing inclusive political systems. Two of these – Bangladesh and Pakistan – are in South Asia. The third, Turkey, was also making progress before the military attempted to overthrow an elected government. The paper suggests that militaries succeed in political interference when a number of conditions are met: democratic institutions are weak; large segments of the population are not happy with the quality of governance on offer; and the military functions as a unified force, with a clear chain of command. Most of these conditions were not present in Turkey. It is too early to tell whether the attempted coup and the reaction to it have set back Turkey's political progress. If it has, it will be*

---

<sup>1</sup> Mr Shahid Javed Burki is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at [sjburki@gmail.com](mailto:sjburki@gmail.com). The author, not ISAS, is liable for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

*consequential for the Muslim world. However, the relative political success of Muslim South Asia may in the end provide the Muslim citizenry some models they could follow.*

## **Introduction**

Using as the backdrop the attempted military coup that briefly rocked Turkey over the weekend of July 15-17, 2016, this essay develops a number of themes that are relevant for the general theme of transition to democracy and its consolidation in transitional societies. The event has particular significance for some South Asian states and the Muslim world, both of which have had considerable experience of military coup d'états and unstable cohabitation of civilian and military powers. It suggests that the relative political backwardness of Muslim nations – in particular those in the western part of the world of Islam – is the result of a number of reasons. Among them is the role of the military. Men in uniform have either held power themselves or have been behind those who could not have ruled without their support. The military became politically important as the political institutions were weak in most Muslim nations. Most militaries, especially those that got involved in politics, were well organized with highly trained and motivated officer class. Several of them had developed deep links with the countries' economy. Also, those in power did not deliver the services the citizenry wanted, giving the military the reason to intervene. However, demographic developments resulting in very young populations with aspirations governments needed to satisfy have changed the political dynamics in most Muslim nations. Unless those who hold the reins of power are able to meet these demands, we will see continuous instability in the region. But the rule by the military is not the answer, something the coup-makers in Turkey discovered only after they had taken the decision to move against an elected government.

This paper is divided into four main parts. The first has a few observations about the relative political backwardness of the Muslim world, in particular the western part (defined below). This is a large subject, much written-about both by western scholars as well as those from the Muslim world itself. The second describes the attempted coup in Turkey, how it began and how it ended and what may be its consequences for the country and the

Muslim world at large. The third provides a brief overview of military interventions in Pakistan and what the men in uniform have learnt from their experience in that country. And finally the fourth part discusses how the impressive political development of India has provided the template the Muslim majority countries in the sub-continent have adopted, perhaps not explicitly but because of the flow of ideas from across the borders. A short section at the end concludes the paper suggesting that the failure of the Turkish coup may help the advance of liberal democracy in the Muslim world.

## **Political Backwardness of the Muslim World**

If the manoeuvres by some segments in the military in Turkey had succeeded, they would have caused a major setback – not only for Turkey’s political progress. The result would have been a slowdown of the political development of the Middle East. This would have vindicated those who believe that political Islam is not compatible with liberal democracy; that Muslim nations do not have the capacity to create durable and inclusive political and economic systems. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, two Boston-based social science professors, have explained at some length the question posed in the title of their book, *Why Nations Fail*. They maintain that unless countries have inclusive systems of governance, they will not be able to achieve stability.<sup>2</sup> Decades earlier, the Harvard economist Albert O Hirschman suggested that unhappy people look for essentially three options. He listed these in the title of his book, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*.<sup>3</sup>

In carrying the story forward it is useful for analytical purposes to divide the Muslim world in two parts: the west and the east. These two parts are following different political development trajectories. The western part has mostly failed to create political systems that would lay the ground for stability. It includes the stretch of land from Morocco in the west

---

<sup>2</sup> Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*, New York, Crown Books, 2013

<sup>3</sup> Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970.

to Bangladesh in the east. It is home to some 1.2 billion Muslim people with the largest proportion living in South Asia. Of these 33 nations, only three seem to be moving in the direction of achieving stability through political modernisation. But the attempted coup would have removed from this class of nations one more country, Turkey, that, until then seemed to be moving in the right direction.

Many in the Muslim world, alienated with their governance, are choosing the “exit” option which is taking several different forms. They range from the Arab Spring approach in which the youth attempted to open their political systems to joining extremist groups such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The July 1 killings in an upscale café in Dhaka, Bangladesh is also an example of the exercise of the exit approach, this time the exiting was done by upper class youths. In more developed political systems, the alienated normally choose the voice option, using the fora provided by elected bodies to air their concerns and demanding that action be taken by way of public policy to allay them. The series of primaries leading up to the nomination by the Democratic and Republican Parties for the United States presidential elections in November 2016 are good examples of the successful working of the western political systems. Donald Trump rose to the top of the Republican ticket by channelizing in his favour the anger and energies of a segment of the white population who had been hurt by the forces of globalisation. They had lost jobs as a result of the migration of a lot of industries to countries such as China and the arrival of immigrants from Mexico.

There are several reasons for the political backwardness of many Muslim nations. Among the more important ones is institutional imbalance between the military and political structures, the failure to define the role of Islam in political and economic governance, and the support often provided by the West to authoritarian governments that managed to take control of government institutions. The citizens of this area need a role model they could follow. South Asia may provide one. The fact that two Muslim majority states in this region, Bangladesh and Pakistan, are managing to move towards the establishment of representative political orders is probably influenced by the presence next door of India, a story of political success. But something more is needed than the Indian example. What is

required is a Muslim majority country that has succeeded or is succeeding in creating inclusive economic and political structures. But systems that fail to make the transition from authoritarian rule to representative political structures will also influence change in the Muslim world.

There is some concern among informed political quarters that Turkey may move in the opposite direction because of the reaction to the failed coup. “It may well be that democracy in Turkey has triumphed only to be strangled at a slower pace,” says Jonathan Eyal, the international director at Britain’s Royal United Services Institute.” The West gave support to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his party in their struggle with the military; that was not always the case when backward moves took place in the politically volatile Middle East. When an Egyptian general, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, led a coup three years ago against the democratically elected president, Mohammad Morsi, the head of Muslim Brotherhood, Washington did not support the democratic government as it has done in Turkey. Often Washington has allowed its strategic interests to over-rule its commitment to promoting democracy in the developing world. Then the policy calculus weighed in favour of lending support to the military. The generals were to be trusted more with Washington’s political preferences in the Middle East than an Islamist political party. “Policy often amounts to choosing the least bad option,” writes Roger Cohen in *The New York Times*. “The least bad – Erdogan’s survival – has prevailed. That does not mean that much worse won’t follow. A failed coup doesn’t mean democracy is the winner. The worst of this prickly autocrat may now be unleashed upon Turkey, with America and its allies able to do little about it.”<sup>4</sup> I have said little up to this point about my strong belief that political and economic developments strongly interact, each influencing the other. Causality is not in one direction. Politics influences economics which in turn impacts politics. Reasonably well-developed institutions help to keep this interaction within manageable bounds. One reason why the forces that supported Erdogan were able to overcome the attempt by the military to overthrow the elected government was the satisfaction of a large segment of the population with the rewards they had received from the president’s economic policies. The administrations that came before the Erdogan government were narrow-based. They

---

<sup>4</sup> Roger Cohen, “Turkey’s coup that wasn’t,” *The New York Times*, July 19, 2016, p. A22.

worked mostly for the Europeanized elite of Turkey. The new president and his party stretched their reach to the neglected Anatolian plateau, home to the majority of the Turkish population but relatively less developed than the coastal areas of the country. The people of this part were also deeply religious unlike those in the country's European and coastal parts. It is their support that brought Erdogan to power and it is their support that pushed the military back when it attempted to wrest power from the elected government.

## **The Turkish Attempted Coup**

The events in Turkey began unfolding late on Friday night (July 15, 2016) as the military moved to stop traffic over two of Istanbul's bridges which cross the Bosphorus and connect the European and Asian sides of the city. "Some people illegally undertook an illegal action outside of the chain of command," Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said in comments broadcast on NTV, a private TV channel. "The government elected by the people remains in charge. This government will only go when the people say so." Shortly after the prime minister spoke, factions of the military issued a statement, claiming it had taken control of the country "with the aim of reinstalling the constitutional order, human rights and freedoms, and to re-establish the ruined public order." The whereabouts of President Erdogan were not known for several hours until he used Facetime on his iPhone to communicate with his followers. He blamed the coup attempt on followers of Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric who lives in self-imposed exile in rural Pennsylvania and who once was an ally of the president. The two had a bitter falling-out in 2013. Turkey made an attempt to have Gulen extradited but failed. The president then purged the judiciary and the police of those linked to Gulen believing that these two government institutions had been infiltrated by the followers of the cleric.

The military in Turkey had long seen itself as the guardian of Turkey's secular system of government established by the country's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Erdogan, initially popular with large segments of the population, moved against the men in uniform. A series of sensational trials had pushed the military back to its barracks. As was noted by

one analyst, “Erdogan attracted a wide-ranging constituency in the early years of his tenure including many liberals who supported his plans to expel the military from politics. But in recent years, he has alienated many Turks with his increasingly autocratic ways, cracking down on freedom of expression, imposing a significant role for religion in public life and renewing war with Kurdish militants in the country’s southeast.”<sup>5</sup> There was some irony in the fact that President Erdogan used the social media to reassert his control over the country having moved against it in the months preceding the coup attempt. As *The New York Times* editorialised “Mr. Erdogan has been no friend to free expression, ruthlessly asserting control over the media and restricting human rights and free speech. Yet thousands responded to his appeal, turning back the rebels and demonstrating that they still value democracy even if Mr. Erdogan has eroded its meaning.”<sup>6</sup>

In a televised speech, after his charged followers faced down the military, Erdogan called United States President Barack Obama and asked the American president to extradite Gulen. “Mr. President I told you myself, either deport or hand over to us this person who lives in 400 acres of land in Pennsylvania. I told you that he was engaged in a coup plot but I was not listened to. Now again after the coup I say it again.” John Kerry, the United States Secretary of State, responded by saying that he fully “appreciates that there will be questions raised about Gulen and obviously we would invite the government of Turkey to present us with any legitimate evidence.” In a rare interview, Gulen accused Erdogan of staging the coup. “I don’t believe that the world believes the accusations made by President Erdogan. There is a possibility that it could be a staged coup.”

The Turkish president moved quickly. His office announced the death toll in street clashes at 265. About 2,800 soldiers were arrested and more than 2,700 judges were dismissed. He said those caught were guilty of an “act of treason” and would “pay a heavy price.” His prime minister proposed changing the constitution so that the plotters could be executed. Eight Turkish army personnel believed to be officers fled to Greece by helicopter, seeking

---

<sup>5</sup> Tim Arang and Ceyland Yeginsu, “Martial law declared in Turkey amid military coup attempt,” *The New York Times*, July 16, 2016, pp. A1 and A8.

<sup>6</sup> *The New York Times*, editorial, “The counter-coup in Turkey,” July 17, 2016, p. A22.

political asylum. But the Turkish foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu said he had asked the neighbouring country to extradite them and was told that they would be returned.

President Erdogan was able to overcome the attempt by some in the military by appealing to the majority that was largely ignored by his predecessors. He had successfully cultivated the support of large segments of the population who did not participate in the governance projects developed both by the military leaders and liberal politicians before the arrival of Erdogan on the political stage. Before the rise of the party that has governed the country since 2003, the elite that ruled the country excluded the middle and lower-middle classes living in Anatolia and some parts of such large cities as Istanbul and Izmir. These were conservative people in terms of their religious beliefs, they favoured the role of private enterprise in economic development, and they wanted the state to take care of those who were disadvantaged.

Why did the military fail to reinsert itself in Turkish politics when it had done several times earlier? It will take time before this question can be convincingly answered. That said, the South Asian experience will help us to understand some of what has happened in the dramatic weekend of July 16-18, 2016. As we will see from the brief discussion of the case of Pakistan, militaries succeed when at least five conditions are present: democratic institutions are weak; large segments of the population are not happy with the quality of governance offered by civilian administrations; military high-commands have the confidence of the entire officer class; conditions have arisen that cannot be addressed by exerting pressure, leading to direct rule intervention; there is a tradition of military intervention in the area in which the country is situated. The first three of these were absent in Turkey leading to failure.

The widespread clampdown after the coup could hurt Turkey in several ways. “Handled more wisely, the failure of the might have been the dying kick of Turkey’s militarists,” wrote *The Economist* in its lead article that appeared on July 23, a week after the attempted military takeover. “Mr. Erdogan could have become the magnanimous unifier of a divided nation, un-muzzling the press, restarting peace talks with Kurds and building lasting



independent institutions. Instead he is falling into paranoid intolerance: More like the Arab despots he claims to despise than the democratic statesman he might have become.”<sup>7</sup>

## **The Case of Pakistan**

The military in Pakistan was in power four times; from 1958 to 1969; from 1969 to 1971; from 1977 to 1988 and from 1999 to 2007 – a total of 32 years out of 69 years Pakistan has existed as an independent political entity. It was always unhappiness with the way the civilian leadership was governing that brought the military to power. With the exception of General Ayub Khan, those from the military who assumed power did not do so for personal ambitions. Even in his case, he took control when he was persuaded that Pakistan needed strong leadership to move on the economic front. He had watched from close quarters the constant wrangling among politicians over power sharing. About the time he moved, the Swedish economist–sociologist Gunnar Myrdal had identified the “soft state” in South Asia as the main reason for the area’s relative backwardness. While he was not aware of the Myrdal position, he had arrived at the same conclusion.<sup>8</sup>

Ayub Khan’s more-than-a-decade-long rule of Pakistan gave the country a very high rate of economic growth. It was achieved by allowing a great deal of space within which it could operate. Growth was preferred over distribution and poverty alleviation. Once this realisation came about, the middle class in the urban areas came out in the streets since the political system did not allow any expression of discontent. Ayub Khan, by now in poor health, was pressured to resign, leaving the government in the hands of General Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan, head of the army at that time. The new military ruler mismanaged both the economy and politics. His nearly-three-year rule broke the country in two, with East Pakistan gaining independence as Bangladesh. With the country having

---

<sup>7</sup> *The Economist*, “The failed coup in Turkey: Erdogan’s revenge,” July 23, 2016, p. 22.

<sup>8</sup> I asked Ayub Khan when I met him for the last time a couple months before his death in April 1974 if he knew about Myrdal’s book, *Asian Drama*, and his identification of the soft state that was holding South Asia back. He said that he was told of this by Altaf Gauhar, a senior civil servant who helped the President write his political memoir, *Friends Not Masters* but was not aware of this until then.

been reduced to half its size, citizens were prepared to try civilian rule, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto became president and later prime minister after the adoption of Pakistan's third constitution in March 1973.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto won the most seats in what was then the province of West Pakistan in the elections of 1970. He did that by promising his followers, many of them very poor, “*roti, kapra, makan*” (food, clothing, shelter). To pay for the programmes he intended to implement, he wanted to expand the resources available to the state. He did that by expropriating private businesses and commercial and financial assets, making the state the most powerful player in the economy. In doing so he *thought* he was following Nehru who had put the Indian state on the “commanding heights of the economy” – a phrase first used by Lenin as his group took control of Russia and created the Soviet Union. But the Indian prime minister had increased the role of the state in the economy by investing government's resources in some of the critical sectors; he did not expropriate the assets owned by private sector. This subtle difference escaped Bhutto, not well tutored in economics. He achieved neither growth nor equality. When a rigged election meant that freedom of expression was not available, people once again took to the street. The military was called in to restore order; it did but also decided to remove Bhutto from office. The armed forces assumed power and General Mohammad Zia-ul Haq became president. For the fourth time Pakistan was placed under martial law in October 1999 when Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif made a clumsy effort to replace General Pervez Musharraf, the army chief. The military was prepared to serve the civilian masters as long as the latter strictly followed the rules of governance. The fourth martial law was the result of a tussle between a well-developed institution and the one that was still in the process of being formed.

I got a glimpse of how the military wielded power in Pakistan without the need to become formally involved. I was then serving as finance minister in the interim government put into office by President Farooq Leghari after he had fired Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto on grounds of corruption and mismanagement. The president had created a supra-cabinet body of nine persons, four military chiefs and four members of the cabinet. Called the Council for Defence and National Security it met under the president's chairmanship and

discussed major policy issues. In one meeting President Leghari inquired from the Defence and Law Minister, one of the members of the CDNS about the position the Supreme Court was likely to take in the case that the dismissed Ms Bhutto had filed challenging the president's decision. Shahid Hamid, the minister, said that the decision was likely to be announced that afternoon and may go against the dismissal order. "In that case, I'll resign," said Leghari. "No sir, you won't," said General Jehangir Karamat, the Chief of the Army Staff, who was sitting to my right. He turned to me and inquired what would happen to the economy in case Ms Bhutto was brought back to govern. I said that it would be a disaster as investors who had begun to come back would lose confidence in the economy. The general then turned to the president and said that was the reason why he would not allow the president to step down. Taken aback, the president asked the general what would happen if he left office as he couldn't serve if the Supreme Court went against his dismissal order. "In that case we'll implement the 'black book,'" said the general. Asked to explain what that book was, the general told the meeting that Brigade No. 111 that was stationed in Islamabad had a book they are required to follow in case the commanders decide to take over the administration. The general, in other words, was threatening to impose martial law in case President Leghari stepped down. The court decision came and went in favour of President Leghari and Pakistan was saved another martial law. It is obvious the Turkish army did not have a "black book" to follow.

## **The Indian Factor: Flow of Ideas across Borders**

Even though borders may be closed, as they have been, between India and Pakistan most of the time, ideas still flow across. With the rapid development of the use of social media in all South Asian countries, this is the case more than ever before. And there are the Bollywood movies and the Pakistani *qawali*. Movies from India are popular across the world – at least wherever there are large South Asian diasporas. They are particularly appreciated in the South Asian sub-continent. *Qawals* from Pakistan are listened to by the devotees whenever they sing at popular Sufi shrines in India. These cultural flows apart,

ideas have also travelled across the borders. As already discussed, Jawaharlal Nehru's "putting the state at the commanding heights of the economy" strategy had a delayed response in Pakistan.

In writing a new constitution for his country that, with the departure of East Pakistan as Bangladesh, was cut down to half its size, Bhutto borrowed heavily from the one Bangladesh had written and adopted on 4 November 1972. Bhutto and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the Bangladeshi state, were disposed to have a strong executive in charge of the government. The prime minister was given more authority than available to the corresponding Indian official. The Pakistani Constitution adopted in March 1973 borrowed from Bangladesh by allowing for the establishment of an interim government to steer the country and make the transition from one elected administration to another. Pakistan also adopted the provision in the Bangladeshi Constitution that allowed the prime minister to appoint up to three advisers from outside the national legislature. They had full ministerial power and rank. This way, the prime minister could bring in from outside the talent and expertise that may not be available to him from within the elected assembly.

Pakistan also inserted the provision that the country's president could dismiss the prime minister and dissolve the national assembly in case he was persuaded that the country was not being well-managed. This was essentially an undemocratic provision incorporated in the Constitution by General Zia-ul Haq who, before inducting an elected prime minister into office, wanted to ensure that he had the constitutional right to dismiss him. The Pakistani military, in other words, was reluctant to let go of the power it had accumulated over the years. This power was exercised five times between 1988 and 1999, once by General Zia-ul Haq who served as president from 1977 to 1988; three times by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, president from 1988 to 1993; and once by Farooq Leghari, president from 1993 to 1997. On all these occasions the president took the military's advice and moved only when he was satisfied that he had its support.

The most important idea to cross the Indian borders with Bangladesh and Pakistan concerns the role of the military in politics. There were six military coups in these two countries; three in Bangladesh and three in Pakistan. Two of Pakistan's three military interventions resulted in the abrogation of the constitution in place at the time the military intervened. In the case of Bangladesh the Constitution was set aside, with the parliamentary form of government replaced by presidential system.

However, the political elites of the two countries, looking across their borders at India, are now persuaded that their militaries will not be tempted to push aside civilian political systems and take command of their nations. As discussed by the historian Sunil Khilnani in his book, *The Idea of India*, South Asia's largest country and also its most diverse, has been successful in putting in place political structures and processes that provide a reasonable amount of accommodation to all citizens.<sup>9</sup>

Unless this is disturbed by the pursuit of "Hinduism first" approach of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the political group that helped Narendra Modi to attain political power, India's political system will continue to profoundly influence those in the rest of South Asia. India has found a way to include religious minorities within its political system, something the Islam-dominated societies are struggling to achieve. That said, the work done by sociologist Riaz Hasan points to the growing alienation of the Muslim minority as it is discriminated against, not deliberately but effectively, by the government and the Hindu majority.<sup>10</sup>

India's political structure is dynamic; it has gone from strength to strength.<sup>11</sup> Modi's ascent to the pinnacle of political power was remarkable in itself. He is a member of the Other Backward Classes (OBCs) who was able to challenge the ruling political elites from the higher castes and in the process succeeded in dispensing with the dynastic politics that had

---

<sup>9</sup> Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, New York, Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1999.

<sup>10</sup> Riaz Hasan (Editor), *Indian Muslims: Struggling for Equality of Citizenship*, Melbourne, Australia, Melbourne University Press, 2016.

<sup>11</sup> For a thoughtful account of India's political development see Subrata Kumar Mitra, *Politics in India: Structure, Process, and Policy*, London, Routledge, 2011.

preceded his rise. This was the case not only in India but in several other South Asian nations as well. The Nehru-Gandhi family in India, the Bhuttos and the Sharifs in Pakistan, and the Mujibs and the Zias in Bangladesh drew their strength in part from electoral politics. However, the families rather than people ruled.

## **Conclusion**

What will be the longer-term consequences of the failed military coup in Turkey? This question leads to two more. Will it strengthen democracy in the country and move another Muslim majority country towards developing an inclusive system of governance? Or will it shift the country's politics towards a greater role for Islam? As noted above, President Erdogan's initial impulse was to blame the military's action on the influence exercised on it by the US-resident Fethullah Gulen. By singling out the cleric for blame, Erdogan demonstrated that even among the Muslims there is no widely-accepted singular role for Islam in politics. His Justice and Development Party, the AKP, has its base among the more conservative segments of the Turkish people – the people who observe Islam but don't necessarily want the religion to be followed in conducting the affairs of the state. Likewise Gulen is for promoting education among the Muslim masses, hoping that a better informed populace would be more inclined to bring their religion into the modern world. Ultimately the precise definition of an Islamic state boils down to the way religion informs the shape of political institutions and the way they function. The growing clamour for a return to Sharia law has alarmed many in the West. For instance, the American politician, Newt Gingrich, once the Speaker of the House, suggested that the Muslims living in the United States should be expelled from the country if they believed that the sharia should be used for governance. But several western scholars of Islam have taken a more accommodating view. Noah Feldman, professor of law at Harvard University, places the sharia movement in a historical context, suggesting that its "ideal of a just legal system, one that administers the law fairly is an understandable goal in a region dominated by entrenched oligarchies."<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>12</sup> Noah Feldman, *The Fall and Rise of the Islamic State*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

In fact it could be argued that the Sharia could stem the authoritarian tendency of President Erdogan that was in full view after the failed coup.

.....